This paper explores the relationship between the relative size of the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector, economic growth, and poverty using a new database on the share of SME labor in the total manufacturing labor force. Using a sample of 76 countries, we find a strong association between the importance of SMEs and GDP per capita growth. This relationship, however, is not robust to controlling for simultaneity bias. Thus, while a large SME sector is a characteristic of successful economies, the data fail to support the hypothesis that SMEs exert a causal impact on growth. Furthermore, we find no evidence that SMEs reduce poverty. Finally, we find qualified evidence that the overall business environment facing both large and small firms-as measured by the ease of firm entry and exit, sound property rights, and contract enforcement -influences economic growth.
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I. Introduction
To accelerate growth and reduce poverty, the World Bank Group and other international aid agencies provide targeted assistance to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in developing economies. For example, the World Bank Group approved more than $10 billion in SME support programs over the last five years, including $1.5 billion in 2002. 1 This pro-SME policy is based on three core arguments (World Bank, 1994 Bank, , 2002 Bank, , 2004 .
First, SME advocates argue that SMEs enhance competition and entrepreneurship and hence have external benefits on economy-wide efficiency, innovation, and aggregate productivity growth. From this perspective, direct government support of SMEs will help countries exploit the social benefits from greater competition and entrepreneurship. Second, proponents of SME support frequently claim that SMEs are generally more productive than large firms but financial market and other institutional failures impede SME development. Thus, pending financial and institutional improvements, direct government financial support to SMEs can boost economic growth and development. Finally, some argue that SME expansion boosts employment more than large firm growth because SMEs are more labor intensive. From this perspective, subsidizing SMEs may represent a poverty alleviation tool.
While the international community channels a large and growing amount of aid into subsidizing SMEs, four skeptical views question the efficacy of this policy (Biggs, 2002) . First, some authors stress the advantages of large firms and challenge the assumptions underlying the pro-SME view. Specifically, large enterprises may exploit economies of scale and more easily undertake the fixed costs associated with research and development (R&D) with positive 1 These statistics are from World Bank (2002) . The World Bank provides direct and indirect support to SMEs. In terms of World Bank activities, 80 percent of World Bank programs involve direct financial assistance to SMEs, while 20 percent of World Bank programs involve indirect support such as technical assistance for SMEs and for institutions that support SME development.
productivity effects (Pagano and Schivardi, 2001; Pack and Westphal, 1986) . Also, some hold that large firms provide more stable and therefore higher quality jobs than small firms with positive ramifications for poverty alleviation (Rosenzweig, 1988; Brown et al., 1990) .
A second set of skeptical views directly challenges the assumptions underlying pro-SME arguments. In particular, some research finds that SMEs are neither more labor intensive, nor better at job creation than large firms . Furthermore, recent work finds that under-developed financial and legal institutions do not only hurt SMEs. Indeed, research finds that under-developed institutions constrain firms from growing to their efficient sizes (Beck, et al., 2002a; and Kumar, et al., 2001) .
A third set of skeptical views question the validity of considering firm size as an exogenous determinant of economic growth. The industrial organization literature posits that natural resource endowments, technology, policies, and institutions help determine a nation's industrial composition and optimal firm size (Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales, 2001) . For instance, some countries may have endowments that give the country a comparative advantage in the production of goods that are produced efficiently in large firms while other countries will have a comparative advantage in goods produced most economically in small firms (You, 1995) .
Similarly, countries that are open to international trade may have a larger optimal firm size than countries that are less integrated internationally (Caves et al., 1980) . As a final example, institutional theories suggest that firm size will reflect the margin between intra-firm transactions costs and market transactions costs, such that as market transaction costs fall relative to intrafirm transactions costs the optimal firm size falls (Coase, 1937) . This margin will vary across industries and countries for various institutional and technological reasons. Thus, from this perspective, pro-SME subsidization policies could actually distort firm size and potentially hurt economic efficiency.
A fourth skeptical view regarding the efficacy of pro-SME policies, which we term the business environment view, doubts the crucial role of SMEs, but instead stresses the importance of the business environment facing all firms, big and small. From this perspective, low entry and exit barriers, well-defined property rights, effective contract enforcement, and firm access to finance characterize a business environment that is conducive to competition and private commercial transactions. While these factors may encourage SMEs, the focus of the business environment view is not on SMEs per se; it is on the environment facing all businesses. Thus, consistent with the other skeptical views, the business environment view questions the pro-SME policy prescription of subsidizing SME development.
In terms of empirical assessments, the microeconomic evidence from a few individual countries does not provide much support for the pro-SME view. The bulk of the firm-level evidence does not support the contention that SMEs are particularly effective job creators.
Furthermore, microeconomic research does not universally support the claim that SMEs foster innovation. Finally, while some firm-level studies find that SMEs intensify competition, the direct evidence on productivity growth fails to confirm the pro-SME view. Thus, as we review in greater detail in the next section, firm-level and industry-level studies do not provide an empirical foundation for subsidizing SMEs.
These microeconomic studies, however, are country-specific and only involve a small number of countries. Thus, it is natural to ask whether cross-country evidence provides an empirical basis for pro-SME policies. However, the absence of comparable international data on SMEs has hampered cross-country analyses of SMEs, growth, and poverty.
This paper provides the first cross-country evidence on the links between SMEs and economic growth and poverty alleviation using a newly built database on SMEs. We construct two measures of SME size. The first measures the share of the SME labor force in the total labor force in manufacturing, where SMEs are defined as firms with 250 or fewer employees. The second measure of SME size is the share of the SME labor force in the total labor force in manufacturing, where we use each country's official definition of an SME. We then assess the relationship between the size of SME sector and economic growth as measured by per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth averaged over the 1990s. Next, we examine the relationship between SMEs and poverty. We use four measures of poverty: (1) the level of income of the poorest quintile of the population in the 1990s, (2) the growth rate of the income of the poorest quintile of the population during the 1990s, (3) the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line, and (4) the "poverty gap," which is a weighted average of the fraction of the population living on less than a dollar a day and how far below one dollar a day incomes fall. In conducting these analyses, we control for an array of country-specific factors.
The cross-country regressions yield the following results. First, in the sense of Levine and Renelt (1992) , there is a robust, positive relationship between the relative size of the SME sector and economic growth. Thus, even when controlling for many other growth determinants, there is a significant, positive relationship between growth and SME size. Second, the SMEgrowth relationship is not robust to controlling for simultaneity bias. While SMEs are a characteristic of fast-growing economies, cross-country analyses do not support the view that SMEs exert a causal impact on long-run growth. Third, we do not find a significant relationship between SMEs and poverty alleviation. Specifically, the size of the SME sector is not significantly associated with the income of the poorest quintile of society, the percentage of the population living below the poverty line, or the poverty gap when controlling for the level of GDP per capita. Also, SME size is not linked with the growth rate of the incomes of society's poorest quintile when controlling for average GDP per capita growth. Thus, we do not find that SMEs exert a differential impact on the poor.
Consistent with industrial organization theories described above, this paper finds that although fast growing economies tend to have large SME sectors, cross-country analyses do not support the view that SMEs exert a causal impact on growth and poverty. The regressions do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that SMEs do not foster growth and poverty alleviation.
Rather, our interpretation is more cautious. We fail to reject the hypothesis that SMEs do not exert a causal impact on growth and poverty. In sum, the cross-country results are consistent with the view that SMEs are a characteristic of successful economies, not an exogenous, causal factor.
While the focus of this paper is on SMEs, we also examine the overall business environment since (1) many policies that promote overall business competitiveness and private commercial contracting may also foster SME growth and (2) we seek to distinguish between the impact of SMEs in particular from policies that foster a competitive environment and private property rights protection in general. We examine an aggregate index of the business environment that incorporates information on entry and exit barriers, effective property rights protection, and sound contract enforcement.
We find some evidence that a business environment that promotes competition, private property rights, and sound contract enforcement boosts economic growth. The overall business environment index remains linked with economic growth even when controlling for the endogeneity of the business environment index. However, we find that the business environment does not influence the poor any more or less than the rest of a country's population. These results are consistent with the view that a competitive, contractually sound business environment lowers poverty by increasing the overall level of GDP per capita, but the business environment does not influence poverty beyond its impact on overall economic development. While suggestive, these results on the business environment must be confirmed by panel studies and microeconomic evidence before one can confidently claim that the business environment causes faster economic growth.
A number of qualifications must be emphasized. First, this paper examines cross-country regressions and therefore does not trace the experience of any single country in depth. Thus, individual countries may have experiences that differ from the aggregate results presented here.
Second, as discussed in Levine and Zervos (1993) , some observers hold that countries are so different that they cannot be viewed as being drawn from the same population and therefore reject the validity of cross-country regressions. Our own assessment is that we control for sufficient country characteristics such that we garner useful -albeit not definitive --information from the cross-country comparisons. Furthermore, our skeptical results regarding pro-SME policies are consistent with the bulk of the microeconomic evidence.
Third, when computing the average rate of per capita GDP growth over the 1990s, the data may reflect steady-state growth factors, transitional dynamics, business cycle phenomena, and crises. This confounds one's ability to interpret the growth regressions as relating solely to long-run growth. While attempting to control for non-steady-state growth influences, we recognize this aggregation problem as endemic to cross-country growth regressions.
Fourth, while this paper uses new, comparable cross-country data on the size of the SME sector, some readers may object to classifying SMEs as firms with less than 250 employees or using official categorizations of firms. Further, following conventional definitions, we define SMEs as formal enterprises and exclude informal enterprises. However, in our regressions, we control for the size of the informal economy. While fully recognizing these methodological limitations, cross-country comparisons are one, useful input into analyzing the relationships between SMEs and economic growth, development, and poverty. Thus, we do not conclude that SMEs do not foster growth, development, and poverty reductions. Rather, this initial crosscountry analysis fails to reject the null hypothesis that the relative size of the SME sector per se does not exert a causal impact on growth or poverty alleviation. We do, however, find that policies and institutions that foster a business environment conducive to competition and private commercial transactions promote economic growth, and through overall growth, lower poverty.
Finally, this paper examines SME employment, not the subsidization of SMEs. Thus, even if the cross-country regressions were to indicate that SMEs exogenously increase growth and development and reduce poverty, this does not necessarily imply that government subsidization of SMEs will have these positive effects. Nevertheless, this paper is a necessary first step in using cross-country analyses to help assess the links between SMEs and growth, development, and poverty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and the questions we address. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 concludes with policy implications.
II. Existing Literature
This section reviews the existing microeconomic evidence on whether SMEs boost growth and reduce poverty. 2
As noted in the introduction, a growing body of work suggests that SMEs do not boost the quantity and quality of employment. Initially, Birch (1979) argued that small firms are particularly important in job creation. He reports that over the 1970s, firms with fewer than 100 employees generated eight out of ten new jobs in America. However, a wide array of evidence rejects the view that small firms are the engines of job formation (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1989; Leonard, 1986; Brown, Hamilton, and Medoff, 1990) . For instance, Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1993) show that while gross rates of job creation and destruction are higher in small firms, there is no systematic relationship between net job creation and firm size.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, Biggs and Shah (1998) find that large firms were the dominant source of net job creation in the manufacturing sector.
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that firm size is not a good predictor of labor intensity, and that labor intensity varies more across industries than across firm-size groups within industries. Many small firms are more capital intensive than large firms in the same industry (Little, Mazumdar, Page, 1987; Snodgrass and Biggs, 1996) . This suggests that SMEs are not necessarily more suitable to the labor abundance and capital shortage characteristics of developing countries.
In terms of job quality, microeconomic evidence does not support the pro-SME view that small firms create better quality jobs than large firms. Empirical evidence shows that large firms offer more stable employment, higher wages and more non-wage benefits than small firms in developed and developing countries, even after controlling for differences in education, experience and industry (Brown, Medoff and Hamilton, 1990; Rosenzweig, 1988) . Many small firms are created as last resort rather than as first choice and have therefore limited growth potential (Compare Liedholm and Mead (1987) for Africa and de Soto (1987) for Latin America.).
Although the Pro-SME view argues that small firms are more innovative than large firms, the microeconomic evidence is at best inconclusive. Examining U.S. firms, Acs and Audretsch (1987) find that small firms have higher innovation rates in "high technology" skill-intensive industries and larger firms have the innovative edge in "lower technology," capital -intensive industries. For a sample of European industries, however, Pagano and Schivardi (2001) show that a larger average firm size is associated with faster innovation rates. In developing countries, there is little R&D activity, so that technology transfers from abroad and imitation drive productivity improvement (Rosenberg, 1976; Baumol, 1994) . In developing countries, researchers find that large exporting firms are typically the primary mechanism through which technologies are adapted from abroad to local circumstances (See Biggs, Shah, and Srivastava, 1996 for Sub-Saharan Africa; Pack, 1992, and Pack and Westphal, 1986 for Asia). Thus, from a developing country perspective, the firm level evidence does not favor SME subsidization as a mechanism for boosting innovation and productivity growth.
Although Pro-SME proponents hold that SMEs intensify competition and hence exert external effects on national productivity, the firm-level evidence does not generally support this conclusion. As reviewed above, the direct evidence on innovation rates does not support a pro-SME approach. Moreover, productivity studies show that total factor productivity is actually highest for medium-sized firms and that the smallest firms are the least efficient (Little, Mazumdar and Page, 1987) .
Consistent with theoretical arguments outlined in the Introduction, 3 emerging empirical evidence supports the view that firm size responds to national characteristics. Beck, Demirguc-3 A large theoretical literature holds that firm size distribution is a function of national endowments, technologies, national policies and institutions (Kumar et al., 2001; Hallberg, 2001; Snodgrass and Biggs, 1996; You, 1995; Caves, Porter, and Spence, 1980) . Also, Piore and Sabel (1984) explain the importance of SME in Italy's textile industry around Florence and Pitoia.with the emergence of industry federations and networks, the role of middlemen and political support. Rasiah (2002) shows the importance of government-business coordination for the development of a vibrant SME sector in Malaysia; variation in the quality of government-business relations, mostly explainable by socio-ethnic characteristics can explain differential performance of small machine tool firms in two different regions. Yamawaki (2002) reports that the existence of leading large firms, the existence of a pooled labor market, and the presence of public research and testing facilities can explain the emergence of SME clusters in Japan. Kawai and Urata (2002) show that subcontracting opportunities promote entry of new firms in Japan while subsidized credit programs discourages it. Levy (1991) shows that the greater role of small manufacturers and export traders in the footwear industry in Taiwan relative to Korea can be explained by higher costs for market Kunt, and Maksimovic (2002a) find that financially more developed countries tend to have larger firms. This suggests that financial development eases financial constraints on successful firms and allows them to grow. Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (2001) show that countries with better institutions, as measured by judicial system efficiency, tend to have larger firms. Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) show that restrained access to inputs, especially credit, results in a bi-modal firm size distribution in Côte d'Ivoire -the "missing middle" -with small firms growing less and large firms growing faster than in developed economies. Thus, institutional development is associated with countries having larger firms. Furthermore, Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (2001) find that improvements in patent protection increase the size of firms in R&D intensive industries. These results emphasize the institutional sources of cross-country differences in firm size. Moreover, these findings do not support the pro-SME presumption that financial and institutional development will boost SMEs relative to large firms and hence lead to economic growth. 4, 5 To complement these firm and industry level studies, this paper undertakes the first broad cross-country examination of the impact of SMEs on growth and poverty using a new database on SMEs. 6 Specifically, we first examine the empirical connections between the size of the SME sector and economic growth and poverty. Second, we assess whether these relationships are transactions in Korea than Taiwan. He explains the lower costs of market transactions in Taiwan with higher GDP per capita, higher levels of education, longer commercial experience and less homogeneous society. Biggs, Raturi, and Srivastava (2002) show the importance of ethnic networks for access to informal sources of finance in Kenya. 4 Note, however, that recent evidence provides support for the view that SMEs face greater obstacles. Using a firmlevel survey of small, medium-sized and large enterprises in 80 developing, developed and transition economies, Schiffer and Weder (2001) show that small firms face significantly higher growth obstacles in several areas, such as financing, taxation and regulation, exchange rate management, corruption, street crime, organized crime, and anticompetitive practices by other enterprises or the government. Using the same dataset, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002b) show that the relationship between financial, legal and corruption obstacles and firm growth is stronger for small firms and in countries with lower levels of financial and institutional development. These papers do not, however, show that countries with larger SME sectors enjoy greater economic success. 5 There is a separate, very extensive literature on the turnover and mobility of firms, see Caves (1998) . 6 Shaffer (2002) assesses the impact of firm size distribution in manufacturing and retail on growth rates of real household income across 700 U.S. cities. robust to controlling for simultaneity bias. Third, we examine whether a competitive, contractually sound business environment exerts a causal impact on economic growth. Finally, we evaluate whether SMEs and the overall business environment influence the rate of poverty reduction beyond any links with economic growth.
III. Data and Methodology
A. Measures of SME Development
To measure the role of SMEs in the economy, we use a newly constructed database on the share of manufacturing employment accounted for by SMEs and construct two measures of SME size (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2003) . While these are the most comprehensive indicators of SME size available for a broad cross-section of countries, they are not without their shortcomings. For instance, it would be useful to have information on SME employment beyond manufacturing, but cross-country data are unavailable for the share of SMEs in other sectors, such as agriculture and services. Another potential problem is that we restrict our definition of SMEs to formal enterprises and exclude informal enterprises, which may represent an important component of output in some economies. In this case, however, we incorporate estimates of the size of the informal sector relative to the formal sector in each economy.
SME250 is the share of the SME sector in the total official labor force in manufacturing when a level of 250 employees is taken as the cutoff for the definition of an SME. This variable provides us with a consistent measure of firm size distribution across countries.
SMEOFF is the share of the SME sector in total official labor force in manufacturing when the official country definition of SME is used, with the official country definition varying between 100 and 500 employees. This variable takes into account that economic and institutional country characteristics might determine characterization of a firm as small, mediumsize or large.
Data on SME250 and SMEOFF are available for 54 and 76 countries, respectively. Table   I lists GDP per capita, SME250, and SMEOFF. There is a large variation in economic development and the relative importance of SMEs. GDP per capita ranges from Burundi (US$ 170) to Luxembourg (US$ 45,185). The importance of SMEs varies between Belarus with less than 5% of total formal employment in SMEs to Thailand with 87%, as indicated by SME250.
B. Measures of the Business Environment
We use two aggregate indexes of the business and institutional environment. The values are listed in Table 1 . Institutional Development is an aggregate indicator of the institutional environment in which firms operate. The underlying data are from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) . We use the average of their six indicators of institutional development. These include information on voice and accountability in the political system, the quality and consistency of regulations and regulatory enforcement in the country, political stability, the rule of law, the lack of official corruption, and the effectiveness of government the government bureaucracy.
Business
C. Measures of economic growth and poverty
As dependent variables in our analyses, we use measures of economic growth, changes in poverty, and the level of poverty.
GDP per capita growth equals the average annual growth rate in real GDP per capita averaged over the period 1990-2000. We also consider the two sources of GDP per capita growth, growth in real physical capital per capita and growth in productivity per capita, following Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) . Specifically, using data from the Penn World Table   6 .0 we calculate the average growth rate in physical capital per capita. The growth rate in productivity is calculated as growth in GDP per capita minus 0.3 times the growth in capital per capita, assuming a capital share of 0.3 in the production function. While we do not report these results, we discuss them in the text.
Growth for poor and Income of poor equal the growth rate of GDP per capita of the lowest income quintile and the level of GDP per capita of the lowest income quintile respectively. We thus evaluate whether there is a differential effect of the size of the SME sector on the lowest income quintile beyond its impact on the growth rate and level of overall GDP per capita.
Headcount is the share of the population living below the national poverty line. The national estimates are based on population-weighted sub-group estimates from household surveys (Chen and Ravallion, 2001) .
Poverty gap is a weighted measure of (i) the fraction of the population living on less than one dollar per day and (ii) how far below one dollar per day incomes fall. Specifically, it is the mean shortfall from the poverty line, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. Thus, this measures the breadth and depth of poverty (Chen and Ravallion, 2001 ).
D. Methodology
Growth regressions
To evaluate the relationship between SMEs and economic growth over the period 1990-2000, we use the following regression:
Where y is the log real GPD per capita, SME is one of our two indicators of the size of the SME sector, BE is either Business Environment or Institutional Development, X is a set of conditioning information, i is the country index, and ε is the white-noise error term. Except for y, all data are averaged over the 1990s. Following Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) , we include initial income to control for convergence effects and secondary school enrolment to capture human capital accumulation. Further, we include several policy variables, such as government expenditures as a share of GDP, the share of exports and imports in GDP, the inflation rate, the black market premium and the share of credit to the private sector by financial institutions in GDP.
Poverty regressions
We also examine the relationship between the SME sector and the growth rate of the lowest income quintile. Specifically, following Dollar and Kraay (2001) 
The coefficient α indicates whether income of the lowest income quintile grows proportionally with overall income growth in the economy, while β indicates whether there is any differential effect of SME development or business environment on income growth of the lowest income quintile beyond any impact on overall income growth. A positive (negative) β indicates the lowest income quintile benefits more (less) than proportionally from SME development and the business environment. We run a similar regression for income per capita growth of the lowest income quintile.
To evaluate the relation between the size of the SME sector, the business environment and the depth and breadth of poverty, we use the following regression
where y is either Headcount, or Poverty gap, averaged over the 1990s, and Y is the log of real per capita GDP, also averaged over the 1990s. Thus, we examine whether the relative size of the SME sector has a particularly large impact on the poor.
Simultaneity bias
The analyses are prone to simultaneity problems. To assess the robustness of the results, we use IV regressions to extract the exogenous component of SME development as well as the business environment. In selecting instrumental variables for the SME size, we focus on exogenous national characteristics that theory and past empirical findings suggest influence the business environment. We use legal origin since cross-country analyses differences in legal systems influence the contracting environment with implications on corporate finance and hence firm formation and growth (Beck and Levine, 2002) . In particular, countries with a recent socialist legal heritage had legal institutions that were not encouraging of entrepreneurship and new firm formation. We also include information on natural resource endowments since Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) , Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Easterly and Levine (2003) , and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) show that endowments influence government policies and institutions that shape the competitiveness environment. Further, we include data on religious composition and ethnic diversity since Stulz and Williamson (2003) argue that Catholic and Muslim countries tend to foster vertical bonds of authority that hurt corporate finance, while Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethnic diversity tends to reduce the provision of public goods, including the institutions that support business transactions and the contracting environment. Finally, we include continent dummies for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America to control for geographic and cultural characteristics that are not captured by any of the other variables.
There is no obvious, ideal instrumental variable set. We, therefore, use an array of different instrumental variable sets to assess the robustness of the results. Furthermore, we provide test statistics on which instrumental variable set is most appropriate for drawing inferences about the impact of SMEs on economic growth.
We provide four statistics to help in selecting the appropriate set of instruments.
First, to test whether the instrumental variables are valid, we use the Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions, which assesses whether the instrumental variables are associated with the dependent variable beyond their ability to explain cross-country variation in the SME share. We refer to this test as "Overid" in the tables. Under the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments (i.e., the instruments not included in the second stage regression) are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation, the Hansen test is distributed χ 2 in the number of overidentifying restrictions. Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies a failure to reject the validity of the instruments and thus a failure to reject the view that the coefficient estimates capture the impact of the importance of SMEs and the business environment on economic growth. In the tables we provide the p-value of the test of the overidentifying restrictions.
Second, when adding new instrumental variables, we test whether these additional instruments are valid. We use the "C-statistic," which tests the exogeneity of the additional instruments (Hayashi, 2000) . Specifically, the C-statistic is defined as the difference of the Hansen statistics of the unrestricted equation (with the smaller set of instruments) and restricted equation (with the larger set of instruments). Under the null hypothesis that both the restricted and unrestricted equations are well-specified, the C-statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of instruments tested. Note that acceptance of the null that the subset of orthogonality conditions is valid requires that the full set of orthogonality conditions be valid. That is, to not reject the validity of the new instruments, both the C-statistic and the "Overid" test must not be rejected. We provide the p-values of the C-statistic and Overid in the tables.
Third, as we add new instrumental variables, we provide the p-value of an F-statistic that we call, "F-test (extra)", which tests whether the extra instruments provide significant additional explanatory power of SME size. Specifically, we test the null hypothesis that the new instruments do not provide any additional explanatory power regarding cross-country variation in SME size as measured by employment in the manufacturing sector. The consequence for including instruments with little explanatory power is bias of the instrumental variable estimator (Hahn and Hausman, 2002; and Staiger and Stock, 1997) . Thus, we will draw more precise inferences about the impact of SMEs on economic growth if (1) the instruments are not weak,
i.e., they explain SME size and therefore reject the F-test (extra), and (2) the instruments do not lead to the rejection of the test of the overidentifying restrictions, i.e., they do not reject the Cstatistic.
Finally, we provide the F-Test of all of the instruments. That is we test the null hypothesis that the instruments do not explain cross-country differences in SME size and provide the p-value in the tables.
E. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Table II lists summary statistics and correlations. There is a wide variation in economic growth across the countries in our sample over the period 1990-2000, ranging from -11% in Georgia to 7% in Ireland. There is also substantial variation across countries in government policies and legal and religious traditions.
Panel B shows the correlations between the level of SME development, the dependent variables and the variables in the conditioning information set. Simple correlations indicate that the size of the SME sector and the business environment are positively correlated with growth and per capita income of the lowest income quintile. The growth rate of the lowest income quintile however is not significantly correlated with SME size or the business environment.
SMEs' share of employment is also higher in countries with higher education and a more developed financial sector, while it is lower in countries with more inflation, more trade and with more exchange rate distortions. There is no significant correlation between the SME measures and the poverty indicators. The business environment indicators are positively and significantly correlated with education, monetary stability, financial development and the incidence of poverty. Finally, countries with a business environment that is conducive to competition and commercial contracting have a larger SME sector. 
IV. Empirical results
A. SMEs, the Business Environment and Economic Growth
SMEs: OLS
The ordinary least squares (OLS) results in Table III indicate that the share of SME employment in total employment is associated with higher rates of GDP growth. Table III reports regression results based on equation (1). Besides the SME indicators, regressions (1) and (2) include initial GDP per capita, the initial level of educational attainment, government consumption expenditures, the rate of inflation, the black market exchange rate premium, the level of international trade to GDP, and the degree of financial development as measured by financial intermediary credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. Regressions (3) and (4) are the same as regressions (1) and (2) except that they also include a measure of the size of the informal sector, which we define below. For the sake of brevity, we only report coefficients on the SME indicators and the size of the informal sector in the Tables.
SME250 and SMEOFF enter significantly and positively in the Table III regressions at the one-percent significance level. These results are robust to controlling for a large number of other potential determinants of economic growth. In unreported robustness checks, we found that both SME indicators continue to enter significantly in the growth regressions even when controlling for the business environment and institutional development. Furthermore, we found that the relation between SMEs and economic growth is robust to leaving out transition economies and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 7
The coefficient size suggests not only a statistically significant but also economically meaningful relationship between the importance of SMEs in an economy and its GDP per capita.
If we compare the countries at the 25 th and 75 th percentiles of SME250, the results suggest that Romania (SME250= 37%) would have grown 1.2% faster if it had had the same SME share as Denmark (69%). This is large, considering that the sample mean annual growth rate for this period is 0.7%.
The relationship between SMEs and economic growth is robust to controlling for the size of the informal economy (columns 3 and 4). Specifically, we use estimates of the size of the informal sector relative to national GDP from Schneider and Enste (1998), Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (2000) and Schneider (2000) , based on the currency demand and DYMIMIC approaches. These authors estimate the market value of output produced by the informal sector as a share of measured GDP. We use measures of informal activity rather than informal labor force because very few countries have data on the size of the labor force employed by the informal sector (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2003) . When we control for the importance of informal economy, both SME measures still enter significantly and positively, while the measure of the informal economy does not enter significantly.
So far the results indicate a very robust relationship between the relative size of the SME sector and the rate of economic growth. Countries with large SME sectors tend to grow quickly.
Given that we have used a simple OLS framework, however, the results are subject to concerns that a large SME sector is a characteristic of successful economies, but not a causal force.
SMEs: IV
To assess whether simultaneity biases drive the strong association between SME size and economic growth, Africa and Latin America to the first set of instruments.
The instrumental variable results in Table IV indicate that the positive relationship between the size of the SME sector and economic growth is not robust to controlling for simultaneity bias. Consider first the first set of instruments that include a dummy variable for the transitional economies and ethnic diversity. SME250 and SMEOFF do not enter significantly in the growth regressions when using these instruments. Furthermore, these instruments do not reject the test of the overidentifying restrictions (Overid) and these instruments strongly reject the null hypothesis that they do not explain SME size. In considering other sets of instrumental variables, there is only one set of instruments that (a) adds significant additional explanatory power in the first stage regressions (F-Test (extra)) and (b) does not reject the null hypothesis that the new instruments are exogenous and valid (C-statistic). This is the last set of instruments, which add dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (columns 9 and 10). In these regressions, neither SME250, nor SMEOFF enter the growth regression significantly and OIR restrictions are not rejected. It is possible to find sets of instruments that produce significant coefficients on SME250, at the 10 percent level in column (3) where legal origin dummy variables are added to the core instrument and at the 5 percent level in column (7) where the religion variables are added as instruments. Nevertheless, in both cases, the additional instruments do not add significantly to the explanatory power in the first stage (F-test (extra)).
Thus, the results with the instrumental variables in columns (1) and (2) or columns (9) and (10) provide more informative, valid conclusions. In sum, if one begins with the null hypothesis that SMEs do not exert a causal impact on economic growth, the instrumental variable fail to reject this view confidently.
The twin findings that (i) SMEs are associated with growth in OLS regressions but (ii)
SMEs are not robustly linked with growth in 2SLS regressions that control for simultaneity bias are consistent with the view that a large SME sector is a characteristic of fast growing economies, but not a determinant of this rapid growth. We find similar results when considering productivity growth instead of GDP per capita growth.
Business environment: OLS
The results in Table V For the overall institutional indicator, the results suggest an economically meaningful impact. A one standard deviation in Institutional Development is associated with two percentage points higher GDP per capita growth rate, while a one standard deviation in the Business Environment indicator explains cross-country growth differences of 0.7 percentage points.
Business environment: IV
Next, we examine whether the relationship between economic growth and the business and institutional environment using instrumental variables. We follow the same pattern as with instrumental variable regressions with SMEs. We examine the same five sets of instruments and present the same tests regarding the validity of the instruments. In all four of the regressions where the data do not reject the test of the overidentifying restrictions, the business environment indicator enters positively and significantly. In contrast, although the earlier analyses found a strong, positive relationship between economic growth and institutional development in the OLS regressions, this relationship loses its significance when using instrumental variables. In sum, cross-country regressions indicate a strong, positive link between economic growth and the business environment even when using instrumental variables to control for simultaneity bias.
B. SMEs, the Business Environment and Poverty Alleviation
Next, we examine the relationship between SMEs, the business environment, and poverty. We examine four different dimensions. First, we assess whether SMEs and the business environment influence the growth rate of the income of the poorest quintile of the country. Second, we examine the relationships between SMEs, the business environment and the level of income per capita of the poorest quintile in society. Third, we study the link between the percentage of people living in poverty and both the size of the SME sector and the business environment. Finally, we investigate the connection between the severity and depth of poverty in a country and the role SMEs in the economy and the business climate.
The results in Table VII Dollar and Kraay (2001) . Most policies do not have any differential effect on the poorest income quintile beyond their effect on overall economic development and growth.
Since earlier findings found that the business environment positively influenced overall economic growth, the results on poverty suggest a positive link between the business environment and poverty through growth. The findings in Table VII suggest that improvements in the business environment affect the lowest income quintile as much as the rest of the country.
The results in Table VIII do not reject the view that there is no relation between the importance of SMEs in an economy, its business environment, and the incidence of poverty as measured by Headcount and Poverty Gap. Neither of the two SME measures enters significantly.
Furthermore, we also do not find any significant relationship between Business Environment, Institutional Development and either of the two poverty measures when controlling for GDP per capita. Note, however, that the results indicate a strong negative relationship between GDP per capita and the incidence of poverty.
The results in Tables VII and VIII do not provide any evidence for a poverty alleviating effect of a larger SME sector. These results certainly do not prove that SMEs do not alleviate poverty. Rather, they simply represent a failure to reject the null hypothesis that SMEs do not reduce poverty.
V. Conclusions
This paper first explored the relationship between the size of the SME sector -as measured by their share of employment -and economic growth and poverty. We use a new database that, for the first time, assembles consistent data on SME size for over 70 developing and developed countries.
Although there is a strong positive association between SME development and economic growth, this relationship is not robust to controlling for simultaneity bias. Moreover, crosscountry comparisons do not indicate that SMEs exert a particularly beneficial impact on the incomes of the poor and we do not find a significant relation between SMEs and measures of the depth and breadth of poverty. Thus, the results do not support the pro-SME prescription of directly subsidizing SME development to accelerate growth and reduce poverty. In sum, although a prosperous SME sector is a characteristic of flourishing economies, this paper's crosscountry regressions do not support the contention that SMEs foster economic success.
Second, we find qualified evidence that advertises the importance of creating a business environment that fosters competition and facilitates commercial transactions for all firms, large, medium, and small. An index of the overall business environment -which incorporates information on entry and exit barriers, sound property rights, and efficient contract enforcement -is associated with the growth rate of GDP per capita. These results do not support the direct subsidization of SMEs but do advertise the potential benefits of policies that strengthen the overall business environment. Finally, while a sound business environment tends to help the poor by accelerating aggregate growth, the results do not suggest that the business environment influences poverty beyond its influence on the overall economy.
Table I SMEs and Business Environment Across the World
GDP per capita is the log of real GDP per capita averaged over the period 1990-2000. SMEOFF is the SME sector's share of employment according to the official definition of the SME sector. SME250 is the SME sector's share of employment when 250 employees is taken as the cutoff for the definition of an SME. Institutional development is an aggregate indicator of institutional quality. Business environment is a principal component indicator of Property Rights, Contract enforcement, Entry and Bankruptcy. 
Table II Summary Statistics and Correlations
SME250 (SMEOFF) is the SME sector's share of employment when 250 employees (official definition) is taken as cutoff for the definition of SME. INFORMAL is the unofficial economy as a percentage of GDP. GDP per capita growth is measured over the period 1990-2000. Income of the poor and growth for the poor are the income level and income growth per capita of the lowest income quintile. Education is secondary school enrollment (% gross). Government consumption is the general govt. final expenditure as a % of GDP. Inflation is the log difference of the CPI. Black market premium is the overvaluation of the official relative to the black market exchange rate in percentages. Trade is share of exports and imports in GDP. Private credit is claims of financial institutions on the private sector, as a share of GDP. Catholic, Muslim and Other religion (other than Catholic, Muslim and Protestant) are the adherents of the respective religion as share of the total population. British, French and German legal origin are dummies with value one for countries with the respective legal origin and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that takes on value one for transition economies and zero otherwise. Latitude is the capital's latitude in absolute terms. Ethnic fractionalization is the probability that two inhabitants of a country do not speak the same language. Africa is a dummy variable that takes on value one for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and zero otherwise. Institutional development is an aggregate indicator of institutional quality. Business environment is a principal component indicator of Property Rights, Contract enforcement, Entry and Bankruptcy. Headcount is the percentage of population living below the national poverty line. Poverty Gap is the amount of additional income per capita, expressed as a proportion of the poverty line, that, if available to the poor would lift them out of extreme poverty. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics
SME Employment and Growth
The regression equation estimated is: GDP per capita growth = α + β 1 Initial Income + β 2 SME +β 3 Education+ β 4 govt. consumption + β 5 Inflation + β 6 Black market premium + β 7 Trade + β 8 Private Credit + β 9 Informal. GDP per capita growth is the real growth rate of GDP over the period 1990-2000. Initial GDP per capita is measured in 1990. SME is the SME sector's share of employment. Education is secondary school enrollment (% gross). Government consumption is the general govt. final expenditure as a % of GDP. Inflation is the log difference of the CPI. Black market premium is the overvaluation of the official relative to the black market exchange rate in percentages. Trade is share of exports and imports in GDP. Private credit is claims of financial institutions on the private sector, as a share of GDP. INFORMAL is the unofficial economy as a percentage of GDP. Log values of all right hand side variables were used. Specifications (1) and (3) use SME-250 and (2) and (4) Adj R-squared 0.652 0.611 0.633 0.671 *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
Table IV SME Employment and Growth: IV regressions
Two stage instrumental variable regressions are carried out. The first stage regression equation is: SME250 (or SMEOFF ) = α 0 + β 1 British legal origin + β 2 French legal origin +β 3 German legal origin+ β 4 Transition + β 5 Latitude + β 6 Catholic + β 7 Muslim + β 8 Protest + β 9 Africa + β 10 Latin + β 11 Ethnic. The variables are defined as follows: SME250 is the SME sector's share of employment when 250 employees is taken as cutoff for the definition of SME and SMEOFF is the SME sector's share of employment when the country's official definition of SME is used. British, French and German legal origin are dummies with value one for countries with the respective legal origin and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that takes on value one for transition economies and zero otherwise. Latitude is the capital's latitude in absolute terms. Ethnic is the ethnic fractionalization. Catholic is percentage of Catholics. Muslim is the percentage of Muslims. Protest is percentage of protestants in the country. Africa is a dummy variable that takes on value one for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and zero otherwise. Latin is a dummy variable which takes the value one for Latin American countries and zero otherwise. The second stage regression equation estimated is GDP per capita growth = α + β 1 Initial Income + β 2 predicted value of SME250 (OFF) +β 3 Education+ β 4 Govt. consumption + β 5 Inflation + β 6 Black market premium + β 7 Trade + β 8 Private Credit. GDP per capita growth is the real growth rate of GDP over the period 1990-2000. Initial GDP per capita is measured in 1990. SME is the predicted value of SME from the first stage. Education is secondary school enrollment (% gross). Government consumption is the general govt. final expenditure as a % of GDP. Inflation is the log difference of the CPI. Black market premium is the overvaluation of the official relative to the black market exchange rate in percentages. Trade is share of exports and imports in GDP. Private credit is claims of financial institutions on the private sector, as a share of GDP. Log values of all right hand side variables are used. Specifications (1) and (2) use Transition and Ethnic as instruments, specifications (3) and (4) use Transition, Ethnic and Legal origin dummies as instruments, specifications (5) and (6) use Transition, Ethnic and Latitude as instruments, specifications (7) and (8) use Transition, Ethnic, and religion variables as instruments and specifications (9) and (10) use Transition, Ethnic, Africa and Latin as instruments. Each specification also reports the F-test for the instruments used and the adjusted Rsquared from the first stage regression. Specifications (3)-(10) also report F-Test (extra) and the C-statistic. In each of these specifications, F-Test (extra) is the F-test for the instruments used in addition to the core instruments of Ethnic and Transition and the C-statistic is a test of exogeneity of the instruments used in addition to the core instruments of Ethnic and Transition. The null hypothesis of the OIR test is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. 
Table V Business Environment and Growth: OLS regressions
The regression equation estimated is: GDP per capita growth = α + β 1 Initial Income + β 2 Business environment +β 3 Education+ β 4 Govt. consumption + β 5 Inflation + β 6 Black market premium + β 7 Trade + β 8 Private Credit. GDP per capita growth is the real growth rate of GDP over the period 1990-2000. Initial GDP per capita is measured in 1990. Education is secondary school enrollment (% gross). Government consumption is the general govt. final expenditure as a % of GDP. Inflation is the log difference of the CPI. Black market premium is the overvaluation of the official relative to the black market exchange rate in percentages. Trade is share of exports and imports in GDP. Private credit is claims of financial institutions on the private sector, as a share of GDP. Business environment is one of two variables : Institutional development is an aggregate indicator of institutional quality. Business environment is a principal component indicator of Property Rights, Contract enforcement, Entry and Bankruptcy. Log values of all right hand side variables were used. Values are 1990-99 averages where available. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
(1) 
Table VI Business Environment and Growth: IV regressions
Two stage instrumental variable regressions are carried out. The first stage regression equation is: Business Environment = α 0 + β 1 British legal origin + β 2 French legal origin +β 3 German legal origin+ β 4 Transition + β 5 Latitude + β 6 Catholic + β 7 Muslim + β 8 Protest + β 9 Africa + β 10 Latin + β 11 Ethnic. Business environment is one of two variables : Institutional development is an aggregate indicator of institutional quality. Business environment is a principal component indicator of Property Rights, Contract enforcement, Entry and Bankruptcy. British, French and German legal origin are dummies with value one for countries with the respective legal origin and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that takes on value one for transition economies and zero otherwise. Latitude is the capital's latitude in absolute terms. Ethnic is the ethnic fractionalization. Catholic is percentage of Catholics. Muslim is the percentage of Muslims. Protest is percentage of protestants in the country. Africa is a dummy variable that takes on value one for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and zero otherwise. Latin is a dummy variable which takes the value one for Latin American countries and zero otherwise. The second stage regression equation estimated is GDP per capita growth = α + β 1 Initial Income + β 2 predicted value of Business Environment +β 3 Education+ β 4 Govt. consumption + β 5 Inflation + β 6 Black market premium + β 7 Trade + β 8 Private Credit. GDP per capita growth is the real growth rate of GDP over the period 1990-2000. Initial GDP per capita is measured in 1990. SME is the predicted value of SME from the first stage. Education is secondary school enrollment (% gross). Government consumption is the general govt. final expenditure as a % of GDP. Inflation is the log difference of the CPI. Black market premium is the overvaluation of the official relative to the black market exchange rate in percentages. Trade is share of exports and imports in GDP. Private credit is claims of financial institutions on the private sector, as a share of GDP. Specifications (1) and (6) use Transition and Ethnic as instruments, specifications (2) and (7) use Transition, Ethnic and Legal origin dummies as instruments, specifications (3) and (8) use Transition, Ethnic, and Latitude as instruments, specifications (4) and (9) use Transition, Ethnic, and religion variables as instruments and specifications (5) and (10) use Transition, Ethnic, Legal origin dummies, Latitude, religion variables, Africa and Latin as instruments. Each specification reports the F-test for the instruments used and the adjusted R-squared from the first stage regression. Specifications (2)-(5) and (7)-(10) also report F-Test (extra) and the C-statistic. In each of these specifications, F-Test (extra) is the F-test for the instruments used in addition to the core instruments of Ethnic and Transition and the C-statistic is a test of exogeneity of the instruments used in addition to the core instruments of Ethnic and Transition. The null hypothesis of the OIR test is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. The regression equation estimated in Panel A is Growth for the poor=α + β 1 GDP per capita growth+ β 2 SME/Business Environment. The dependent variable is the growth rate of the lowest income quintile group. SME250 is the log of SME sector's share of employment when 250 employees is taken as cutoff for the definition of SME and SMEOFF is the SME sector's share of employment when the country's official definition of SME is used. Institutional development is an aggregate indicator of institutional quality. Business environment is a principal component indicator of Property Rights, Contract enforcement, Entry and Bankruptcy. Growth for the poor and GDP per capita growth are calculated for the latest five-year period. The regression equation estimated in Panel B is Income of the poor=α + β 1 GDP per capita + β 2 SME/Business Environment. The dependent variable is the log value of the GDP per capita of the lowest income quintile group. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.
Panel A: Growth for the Poor
(1) (20 (3) The regression equation estimated is Headcount/ Poverty Gap=α + β 1 GDP per capita+ β 2 SME/Business Environment. GDP per capita is the Log of GDP per capita. Headcount is the percentage of population living below the national poverty line. Poverty Gap is the amount of additional income per capita, expressed as a proportion of the poverty line, that, if available to the poor would lift them out of extreme poverty. SME250 is the log of SME sector's share of employment when 250 employees is taken as cutoff for the definition of SME and SMEOFF is the SME sector's share of employment when the country's official definition of SME is used. Institutional development is an aggregate indicator of institutional quality. Business environment is a principal component indicator of Property Rights, Contract enforcement, Entry and Bankruptcy. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. Adj. R-squared 0.286 0.261 0.261 0.303 0.282 0.304 0.298 0.252 *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively
